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1Parameters of Reform and Unification in Modern 
Japanese Buddhist Thought:
Murakami SenshØ and Critical Buddhism
JAMES MARK SHIELDS
REFORM is a word that, one might easily say, characterizes more than anyother the history and development of Buddhism. One can see the impulse
for reform as far back as the Second Council at Vaishali, held barely a cen-
tury after the death of Siddhårtha Gautama, which led to the split between the
Elders (Sthaviravådin) and the Great Order (Mahåså∫ghika), thus setting in
motion the wheel of Buddhist sectarianism. It is certainly true that since
Buddhism first “officially” arrived on the shores of Ky¨sh¨ in the 6th century
CE via the Paekche Kingdom of Korea, the imperative to develop and restruc-
ture Buddhism to suit contemporary needs has been a defining motif within
Japanese Buddhism. GyØgi (668–749), SaichØ (767–822), K¨kai 
, HØnen , DØgen , Shinran , Nichiren , and Ingen may
all be considered as part of this general wave. Although this paper, along with
others in this volume, is concerned with specifically modern movements
towards Buddhist reform in Japan, it is important to bear in mind that one
could construct a long genealogy behind such movements. Yet, it must also
be said that reform movements in East Asian Buddhism have often taken on
another goal—harmony or unification; that is, a desire not only to reconstruct
a more worthy form of Buddhism, but to simultaneously bring together all
* This is a revised version of a paper delivered at the XIXth World Congress of the Inter-
national Association for the History of Religions, Tokyo, Japan, 25 March 2005.
2existing forms under a single banner, in theory if not in practice. Like the drive
for reform, this urge to merge also has long precedents in Japan, dating back
as far as J¨shichijØ kenpØ (Seventeen Article Constitution) by
ShØtoku Taishi 2 in which the various emergent streams of Sino-
Japanese culture are quite consciously fused together as one, amid the expos-
tulation to “consider harmony as the most valuable.”3 This paper explores
some of the tensions between the desire for reform and the quest for harmo-
ny in modern Japanese Buddhist thought, by comparing two developments:
the late nineteenth-century movement towards “New Buddhism” (shin
bukkyØ ) as exemplified by Murakami SenshØ (1851–1929),
and the late twentieth-century movement known as “Critical Buddhism”
(hihan bukkyØ ), as found in the works of Matsumoto ShirØ and
Hakamaya Noriaki.
Critical Buddhism
In the mid to late 1980s, Matsumoto and Hakamaya, two SØtØ Zen school
scholars at Komazawa University, launched a short-lived but controversial
scholarly campaign in the name of something they called hihan bukkyØ—
Critical Buddhism. The ferment reached a peak in the early 1990s, with the
publication of Hakamaya’s Hongaku shisØ hihan (Critiques of
the Doctrine of Original Enlightenment, 1989), Hihan bukkyØ (Critical Bud-
dhism, 1990), DØgen to bukkyØ (DØgen and Buddhism, 1992), and
Matsumoto’s Engi to k¨: NyoraizØ shisØ hihan : 
(Prat¥tya-samutpåda and Emptiness: Critiques of the Doctrine of Tathågata-
garbha, 1989) and Zen shisØ no hihanteki kenky¨ (Critical
Studies on Zen Thought, 1994), followed by a session at the American
Academy of Religion’s 1993 meeting in Washington, D.C., entitled “Critical
Buddhism: Issues and Responses to a New Methodological Movement,” out
of which emerged the English-language collection of essays, Pruning the
Bodhi Tree: The Storm over Critical Buddhism (Hubbard and Swanson 1994).
As with all storms, this one, we might say, eventually passed the critical stage,
to the extent that for many scholars Critical Buddhism is now something of a
dead horse.4 Yet there are a number of important lessons to be learned from
2 Proclaimed in 604 CE.
3 Ichi ni iwaku, yawaragu o motte tØtoshi to shi, sakaurukoto naki o mune to seyo
.
4 It has recently been brought to my attention that the two instigators of Critical Buddhism
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3Critical Buddhism, not least with respect to the often competing drives to-
wards Buddhist reform and unification.5
The main arguments of Critical Buddhism can be briefly summarized as
follows: (1) for over 1500 years, the Mahåyåna streams in general, and mod-
ern Japanese offshoots in particular, have verged further and further off course
from the true path of Buddhism, which is based on core doctrines like prat¥tya-
samutpåda and has a decidedly critical, rational, and humanistic intent; (2)
the causes of this degeneration, though many, can be located especially in the
development of doctrines tending towards essentialism or what is called “top-
ical Buddhism”—for example, tathågata-garbha (Jp. nyoraizØ ),
Suchness (Jp. shinnyo ), Buddha-nature (Jp. busshØ ) and original
enlightenment thought (Jp. hongaku shisØ ); (3) finally and most cru-
cially, the broad acceptance of such quasi-essentialist doctrines have led inex-
orably to the emergence of forms of Buddhism that lack all critical, rational,
discriminatory elements, and that, correspondingly, are bereft of a strong
foundation for Buddhist ethics and social justice in the modern world. Thus,
Matsumoto and Hakamaya were pushing above all for fundamental reform
of Buddhist doctrine and practice. Unlike previous reformers, however, they
were not interested in bringing unity or harmony to the various Buddhist
schools, but rather in clearly distinguishing the core doctrines and values of
True or Critical Buddhism from False or Topical Buddhism—even if such
means, as they thought it would, pruning a great part of the Bodhi tree.
In all that has been written about Critical Buddhism, in both Japanese and
English, very little attention has been paid to the place of the movement within
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have since had a rather acrimonious, public falling-out. Matsumoto, in particular, has chosen
to distance himself and his work from the tasks of his erstwhile collaborator.
5 I will not here go into the many-sided arguments of Critical Buddhism, but it should be
noted that the “movement,” though largely based on the work of only two scholars, caused
much debate and even backlash within the Japanese Buddhist community. One reason for this
was the forthright, combative style employed by both scholars, though one might say
Hakamaya in particular, a form which is particularly foreign to traditional Japanese scholarship.
But another was the simple fact that Critical Buddhism challenged many of the shibboleths of
East Asian Mahåyåna—the Zen schools in particular. Called everything from fundamentalist,
neo-conservative, liberal, Westernized, and even “non-Buddhist,” Matsumoto and Hakamaya
have generally stood their ground against counter-attacks. In this paper, while speaking about
Critical Buddhism as a whole, I will concentrate in particular on the work of Matsumoto, who
is both more consistent and concise in his argumentation than the broader-ranging Hakamaya
(see Sueki 1997, p. 321).
4the larger traditions of Japanese Buddhist reform.6 Thus, I would like in what
follows to reconsider Critical Buddhism in relation to the concerns of the pre-
vious, much larger trends towards Buddhist reform that emerged almost
exactly 100 years previous—the so-called shin bukkyØ or New Buddhism of
the late Meiji era. Shin bukkyØ is a catch-all term that includes the various
writings and activities of Inoue EnryØ (1858–1919),7 Shaku SØen 
(1859–1919),8 and Kiyozawa Manshi (1863–1903),9 as well as
the so-called DaijØ hibussetsuron , a broad term used (often crit-
6 Dan Lusthaus (1997) alludes to the historical “inevitability” as well as the “necessity” of
Critical Buddhism. Lusthaus is one of the few scholars to engage Critical Buddhism from a
historical rather than purely buddhological or philological perspective, raising the possibility
that the arguments of Critical Buddhism may be the recurrence of “an intrinsic Buddhist
debate.” Still, Lusthaus is concerned mainly with ancient Buddhist debates from India and
China, not with more modern ones within Japan.
7 Inoue, perhaps the most influential of all these Buddhist reformers, published his BukkyØ
katsuron joron (Introduction to the Revitalization of Buddhism) in 1887. Like
Shaku SØen and the delegates to the 1893 Columbian Exposition, and against the so-called
DaijØ hibusseturon, Inoue combined a strong sense of Japanese nationalism and a faith in the
universal message of (Mahåyåna) Buddhism with a commitment to presenting Buddhism as
the most modern and “scientific” of all the world’s religions (see Staggs 1979, Snodgrass
1998).
8 Shaku SØen, Rinzai Zen master, abbot of Engakuji in Kamakura and teacher of D.
T. Suzuki, led the Japanese delegation at the first World’s Parliament of Religions held at the
Columbian Exhibition in Chicago, 1893 (see Snodgrass 1998, Snodgrass 2003). SØen, who
advocated Buddhist unity—in his collaborative multivolume project, Essentials of Buddhist
Teachings—as well as hegemony—he proclaimed Japanese Mahåyåna the “universal” reli-
gion of the modern world—is targeted by Brian Victoria (1997, pp. 25–29, 59–60, 98–99,
109–10) for his complicity in the early development of “Imperial Way Zen” in Japan.
9 Kiyozawa was a central figure in the Higashi Honganji (Shin) school reform movement
(Higashi Honganji kaikaku undØ ) of the 1890s. More than the other figures
mentioned here, but akin to thinkers of the later Kyoto School (KyØto gaku-ha ),
Kiyozawa was interested not simply in Buddhism but in coming to understand religion in a
deeper and more general, existential sense. Like Nishida KitarØ (1870–1945),
Tanabe Hajime (1885–1962), and Nishitani Keiji (1900–1990) after him, he
would come to understand the core of Buddhism (and religion) in terms of a kind of trans-
formative or ‘pure’ experience. His Skeleton of a Philosophy of Religion, distributed at the
Columbian Exposition in 1893, explains the core of religion as being, “more than just the activ-
ity of the infinite power, it is the process by which the finite becomes the infinite. Of this side
of the finite, we might say that it is the way that the finite reaches out towards the infinite.
Moreover, among the innumerable forms of the finite, it is through our individual souls, or we
might say the evolution of consciousness, that we attain to the infinite—this is the essence of
religion” (Kiyozawa 2002 p. 141).
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5ically) to describe Buddhist writers who suggested that Mahåyåna Buddhism
is not, in fact, the Buddhism taught by the “historical” Buddha Íåkyamuni.
Of these, I will make a few general remarks about DaijØ hibussetsuron, before
turning attention more specifically to the work of Murakami SenshØ, in order
to flesh out some of the similarities and differences between his attempt to
construct a “unified Buddhism” and the work of his late twentieth-century
avatars, the Critical Buddhists. Though a number of their aims and ideas over-
lap, I will argue that there remain fundamental differences with respect to the
ultimate purposes of Buddhist reform. This issue hinges on the implications
of key terms such as “unity” and “harmony” as well as the way doctrinal
history is categorized and understood, but it also relates to issues of ideolo-
gy and the use and abuse of Buddhist doctrines in twentieth-century politics.
DaijØ Hibussetsuron
As Western culture and values, including models and methods of Western
scholarship on religion, began to make themselves felt in the mid to late Meiji
period, it was inevitable that such would lead some Buddhist scholars towards
a demythologized,10 rational, ethical and historicist understanding of Bud-
dhism. Though it can hardly be considered a school or movement in its own
right, theories of scholars who adopted such tendencies came to be known,
often derisively, as DaijØ hibussetsuron, which may be literally translated as
the “theory that the Mahåyåna teachings are not true Buddhism.” The term
was applied to the writings of several Buddhist scholars beginning in the
1890s such as Murakami and Anesaki Masaharu (1873–1949), the
latter of whom would eventually, and perhaps not incidentally, be appointed
as first professor of Religious Studies at Tokyo Imperial University in 1905.
Inspired by Western scholarly notions of empiricism and scientific method,
DaijØ hibussetsuron sought to clarify and demarcate the limits of what should
be included under the rubric “Buddhism.” The conclusion was that the so-
called Great Vehicle was a repository for supernaturalism, mysticism, defor-
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10 This drive towards demythologization of a religious tradition finds a parallel in Western
scholarship on religion of the same period, particularly the drive towards uncovering the “his-
torical Jesus,” as well as the slightly later work of German theologian Rudolf Bültmann. As
with such Western Christian scholars, the scholars of DaijØ hibussetsuron were generally work-
ing to preserve some pure essence of their tradition by opening the gates to historical critical
method, in the sincere belief that science could provide religious answers that mythology and
even centuries of doctrinal development could not. It is important to note the fact that, in both
cases, there was a distinct “theological” undercurrent at work.
6mities or corruptions of the original, pure teachings, better preserved in the
“H¥nayåna” and latter-day Theravåda streams of Southeast Asia. Controversy
of course ensued, most of the criticism coming, unsurprisingly, from the Bud-
dhist establishment, those still powerful institutions understandably reluctant
to serve up their long-standing beliefs on the altar of “modern” (and Western-
inspired) sensibilities.
It should also be recalled that this was only a few scant years after the brief
but brutal state-sponsored persecution of Buddhism under the slogan haibutsu
kishaku —lit. “Throw away Buddha and abolish Íåkyamuni!”
Though the program of disestablishment was soon reversed, it was to leave
an important imprint on late nineteenth-century Buddhism. Inoue’s plea for
“revitalization,” Murakami’s desire for “unity,” and the more general DaijØ
hibussetsuron quest for a rational, true Buddhism—in short, virtually all the
permutations of shin bukkyØ—can be traced back to the after-effects of
haibutsu kishaku.11 It is also important to note that the reaction to DaijØ hibus-
setsuron cannot be separated from the fact that the most well-known prece-
dent for DaijØ hibussetsuron within Japan does not come from one of the
Meiji scholars influenced by Western thought but rather from the controver-
sial writings of an Edo-period scholar by the name of Tominaga Nakamoto
(1715–46). Tominaga may well have been the first writer “system-
atically to question the assumption that the Mahåyåna sutras, or indeed oth-
ers, were transmitted directly from the [historical] Buddha.”12 Moreover,
without, once again, the benefit of “Western learning,” Tominaga came to
this conclusion by “the critical, historical method of juxtaposing innumerable
variations in the various texts and illustrating how these arose in order for
some point to be made over against another school.”13 Tominaga’s work
raised a strong challenge to the claims to authority of the various Mahåyåna
schools, a challenge hardly mitigated by the aggressive and sometimes deri-
11 “‘Shin Buddhism’ was shaped by the imperatives of the institutional, social, and politi-
cal crises of the early Meiji period, and the need to produce an interpretation of Buddhism
appropriate to the new society. By the early 1890s, this Buddhism was further determined by
the links between Buddhist revival and emerging nationalism” (Snodgrass 1998, p. 325).
12 Perhaps not incidentally, Tominaga may have also been the first scholar in Japan to employ
the term sh¨kyØ in a sense that approximates its modern usage (Pye 1990, p. 122). As Ian
Reader (2004, p. 9) has pointed out, this flies in the face of the assumptions of scholars such
as Tim Fitzgerald, who insist that the concept of “religion” is a cultural borrowing (or impo-
sition) from the West.
13 Pye 1990, p. 5.
T H E  E A S T E R N  B U D D H I S T  X X X V I I ,  1  &  2
7sive tone he took towards those who “vainly say that all the teachings came
directly from the golden mouth of the Buddha.”14 The point in raising this
earlier example of DaijØ hibussetsuron is to show that there was an under-
standable assumption of those who were faced with these types of historical
arguments to see them as a direct challenge to not only the truth of certain
Mahåyåna teachings but to the institutional authority of the Mahåyåna
schools. Even scholars today tend to read the work of Murakami in light of
this more extreme version of historicism, despite the fact that he rarely, if
ever, went to the extremes of Tominaga or his own shin bukkyØ contempo-
rary Takada DØken (1858–1923).15 As I want to show in the fol-
lowing, this is a mistake. Although the very term DaijØ hibussetsuron carries
normative baggage—i.e., a sharp criticism of Mahåyåna traditions as being
‘deviations’ from the true Buddhism taught by Íåkyamuni—this normative
addendum does not apply to the mature work of Murakami.
On BukkyØ tØitsuron
In his magnum opus, BukkyØ tØitsuron (On the Unification of
Buddhism), Murakami attempted to employ the tools of modern critical schol-
arship to discern a clear historical and doctrinal foundation for Buddhism.
The result is at once an original, impressive, yet deeply flawed piece of
Buddhist scholarship—a “gorgeous failure”16 whose grand aspiration to
bring about a “scheme for the amalgamation of all Buddhist sects” was bound
to end in disappointment.17 Written in fits and starts over a period of more
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14 Ibid., p. 4.
15 Takada, though also an advocate of non-sectarian “unification,” developed a far stricter
line against “superstition” (meishin ) within the Mahåyåna. See LoBreglio’s article in this
issue, in which he notes, quite rightly, that Takada may be considered an early twentieth-cen-
tury prophet of Critical Buddhism.
16 Sueki (1993) clearly outlines the main failings of Murakami’s scholarship, not least of
which are his complete lack of Sanskrit and dismissal of Western scholarly conclusions on
Buddhism.
17 As Murakami himself, by the time of writing the final volume, Jissenron (1927),
came to acknowledge: “At the time of its first publication, theoretically and also practically,
there was a possibility of Buddhist unity, as well as the thought that such was necessary.”
However, after this time, he could not help but acknowledge that while, “the theoretical pos-
sibility remained, the practical possibility did not.” This seems to contradict or at least prob-
lematize his earlier admission that the unification he sought was not to be taken at the “formal”
level. In any case, Sueki argues, correctly, I think, that the failure of BukkyØ tØitsuron has as
much if not more to do with inherent problems in Murakami’s approach as it does with chang-
8than twenty years,18 its argument is, on the face of it, deceptively simple:
Buddhism can and should be unified, because, whether Buddhists themselves
recognize it or not, underlying all the manifold teachings (kyØsØ ) is a
common, fundamental core or essence of doctrine (kyØri ), which pro-
vides not only the historical trunk but also the life-giving sap of the great
Buddhist tree.19 Although he admits that unification at the “formal level” may
not be possible, unification at the “ideal level” is not only possible and nec-
essary but has historical precedent in the harmonizing work of SaichØ, founder
of the Tendai school in Japan.20
In reading BukkyØ tØitsuron, one thing becomes immediately obvious:
although Murakami was a self-consciously modern scholar ostensibly dedi-
cated to rigorous historical scholarship, he was not so quick to follow the path
of complete demythologization—he clearly states his commitment to uncov-
ering not only the bare facts of Buddhist history, but also to the more elusive
religious or doctrinal dimensions that bind Buddhists of all stripes together.
In other words, Murakami employs what he refers to elsewhere as a “Bud-
dhistic” (bukkyØ shugi ) approach to history, whereby the faith dimen-
sion retains a central place. This is a point where there appears to be a glaring
difference between the methods of Murakami and Critical Buddhism, which
is famous for Hakamaya’s pithy conclusion that “only criticism is Bud-
dhism”—in other words, that the truth of Buddhism can be found only through
(and within) rational, critical, processes of analysis and empirical discrimi-
ing social and religious circumstances (Sueki 2004, p. 101).
18 Successive volumes were published in 1901, 1903, 1905 and 1927 (see Sueki and Mohr
in this issue).
19 Murakami 1997, p. 10. Murakami’s use of kyØsØ, is of course related to the traditional,
particularly Mahåyåna Buddhist teaching of upåya-kaußalya (Jp. hØben )—expedient
means or “beneficent deception”—used especially by Chinese Buddhists “to help deal with
the hermeneutical problem of reconciling the disparities among the different teachings attrib-
uted to the Buddha—to explain that the differences in the teachings of the Buddha delivered
in his forty-nine-year ministry were the result of the different audiences he addressed” (Charles
Muller, Digital Dictionary of Buddhism [hereafter DDB], s.v. “upåya-kaußalya”).
20 Ibid., pp. 178–82. By contrast, Murakami has little to say of SaichØ’s peer and rival, K¨kai,
founder of the esoteric Shingon school. Perhaps this has to do with K¨kai’s more openly super-
cessionist approach to rival schools, including SaichØ’s Tendai (see note 25). K¨kai appears
to have found SaichØ’s all-embracing pluralism insufficient for Buddhist “reform,” as did the
various Kamakura-era founders (HØnen, Eisai , Shinran, DØgen, Ippen ), all of whom
emerged from Tendai to establish their own schools, each adhering to a pared down vision of
the best means to awakening.
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9nation. Yet, looking beyond the CB rhetoric of rationalism and concomitant
affection for the work of Ren¡ Descartes, we see that in fact both Matsumoto
and Hakamaya admit that there is a core of fundamental doctrines to which
all Buddhists must adhere—a ground or bedrock that cannot be further
reduced. To take the best example, and one I will return to later on, the twelve-
link chain of equiprimordiality,21 the single most basic and important
Buddhist doctrine according to Critical Buddhism, is one that, while it may
be rationally understood to a certain degree, must ultimately be accepted on
what amounts to unwavering faith. Murakami also places prat¥tya-samutpåda
among the very core teachings of Buddhism in all its forms, and remarks, in
a very similar fashion, that while faith should not be completely irrational, it
does and must come into play: “As a rule,” he states,
there are two main forms to what is referred to as religious faith.
One, which does not require an appeal to common sense, is belief
beyond or outside anything rational, while the other is faith obtained
through approval of an appeal to reason or common sense. In these
two types of faith, the first cannot help but disappear through the
advance of society and progress, while only the second can accom-
pany social progress. If we foolish scholars are unable to throw
away our common sense and develop a faith outside of reason, how
could more lettered men possibly do so.22
An Ideality of Origins?
Before taking these connections further, another important issue to ponder
when considering Murakami’s work is the problem of what the philosopher
Michel Foucault called the “ideality of origins” (itself a modernist version of
the genetic fallacy)—understood here as the notion that True Buddhism can
S H I E L D S :  P A R A M E T E R S  O F  R E F O R M  A N D  U N I F I C A T I O N
21 Prat¥tya-samutpåda is variously rendered in English as “co-dependent arising,” “depen-
dent origination,” or other permutations of such, none of which sufficiently conveys the
nuances of this important term (though “equiprimordiality” perhaps comes closer than those
listed above). Given the continuing debates concerning a precise English translation of
prat¥tya-samutpåda, I have chosen to leave it in the Sanskrit, which is the most familiar read-
ing for buddhologists (though Hakamaya seems to prefer the Påli pa†icca-samuppåda; see,
e.g., Hakamaya 1990, p. 16). At any rate, the Japanese engi similarly fails to convey the
full Indian meaning, particularly as the word has come to mean, in ordinary Japanese, some-
thing like the English “omen.”
22 Murakami 1997, p. 464; also see Sueki 2004, p. 21.
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only be found in the words and teachings of the “historical Buddha” Íåkya-
muni. Such a belief characterizes much of Buddhist writing from ancient
times up to and including the shin bukkyØ scholars of the Meiji era; in fact, it
is hard to find any Buddhist writer prior to the twentieth century who does
not implicitly or explicitly make such a claim, and believe correspondingly
that their own school’s teachings were the ones actually taught by Íåkyamu-
ni himself (or, in the case of more belated traditions like Chan/Zen, if not
actually taught then at least “thought” by Íåkyamuni). As Tominaga shrewd-
ly noted, as far back as 250 years ago, the appeal to origins as a source for
authority in Buddhism led to the wilful misattribution of Mahåyåna sutras to
the time of the Buddha.23 Does Murakami fall for this originalist temptation,
which, by modern standards of scholarship, is virtually impossible to
defend?24 I must confess that I cannot say for certain either way; on this issue,
as with so many others, Murakami’s position is ambiguous. While he clear-
ly does believe that the core doctrines of Buddhism date back to the original
teachings of Íåkyamuni, he also allows that later doctrinal forms, of the
Mahåyåna in particular, are “constructions.” At any rate, to give perhaps
unwarranted credit, the very ambiguity of Murakami on this matter opens up
the possibility that his work towards Buddhist reform and unification need
not rely on what most would recognize today as a flawed and untenable
premise.
Though an in-depth exploration of this matter would take us beyond the
scope of the present paper, the point requires some further elaboration. Most
of Murakami’s shin bukkyØ peers, including Shaku SØen and Inoue EnryØ,
dealt with the problem of Mahåyåna’s inescapable historical belatedness in a
23 Ironically, Tominaga himself, or at least the type of DaijØ hibussetsuron that is implied
by his writings, may also fall for the originalist trap, in the sense that the assertion that, based
on historical evidence, the Mahåyåna sutras are belated texts with little connection to the his-
torical Buddha, betrays a reliance upon origins as the source for what is or is not a truly
“Buddhist” text or teaching.
24 First, at least until someone comes up with a workable time machine, we simply cannot
know, and will most likely never be able to know, what “Íåkyamuni’s original teachings”
really were. Even the texts that make up the Påli Canon date from at least several centuries
after the Buddha’s death. Second, even without the various “postmodern” criticisms of such
an approach, it might be argued that the very idea that Buddhism has or must have what amounts
to an ahistorical, non-contingent, non-cultural “essence” or foundation of any sort, betrays a
number of key Buddhist doctrines regarding conditionality and impermanence. This point,
which has been elegantly argued by Dale Wright (1997), might even be used against Critical
Buddhism.
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traditional way, by accepting the medieval Tendai teaching of the goji or
“Five Periods” of the Buddha’s teachings,25 whereby “not only were the
Mahåyåna sutras indisputably the Buddha’s teachings, directly transmitted to
the world by Íåkyamuni, but they were his first teaching, his last teaching,
and the only complete teaching of his Truth.”26 One way to understand this
particular Mahåyåna “hermeneutic” is to contextualize the emergence of the
Mahåyåna “schools” vis-£-vis the older, more traditional ones. Understand-
ing the truth of Buddha’s teachings as being beyond historical place and time
fits well with Mahåyåna understandings of the power and abilities of Buddhas
and Bodhisattvas, as well as the important trope of upåya-kaußalya or expe-
dient means in teaching the Dharma.27 We can see hints of this approach in
the following passage:
Íåkyamuni Buddha was a human being; in fact, the only Buddha
to have existed historically. While the Mahåyåna teachings are not
the original teachings of the Buddha, they do reflect the intention
of the Buddha. The conflation of these ideas should not be surpris-
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25 Though this particular Tendai version is thought to be based on a teaching from the
Saddharmapuˆ∂ar¥kas¨tra (Lotus Sutra), one can find very similar ideas in the Ta-ch’eng
chi’i-hsin lun (Awakening of Faith)—a text roundly criticized by Critical
Buddhism as one of the founding documents of “topicalism”—as well as the work of Heian-
period Shingon school founder K¨kai, who produced his own “Ten Stages” of the progression
of religious consciousness ( j¨j¨ shin ), including not simply the main Buddhist schools
but even, on the very bottom, Confucianism and Taoism. K¨kai’s own “esoteric” Shingon
school, it goes without saying, finds itself at the pinnacle of this supercessionist schema.
26 Snodgrass 1998, p. 328; see Inoue 1954, Ketelaar 1990. In 1895, Shaku SØen would
declare, with unconcealed satisfaction, that “the mistaken idea that Mahåyåna Buddhism was
not actually the Buddha’s teaching had been put to rest” (Snodgrass 1998, p. 329); and that,
in fact, the specifically Japanese versions of Mahåyåna could be considered the core truth for
the whole world, thus eclipsing the other great religions such as Christianity and Islam—doing,
in effect, to the world religions what Mahayanists had long done to earlier Buddhist traditions
—supercession in the name of both authenticity and “modernity.”
27 The locus classicus for this is, of course, the Saddharmapuˆ∂ar¥kas¨tra itself. While the
standard Mahåyåna apologetic asserts that the Saddharmapuˆ∂ar¥kas¨tra was indeed taught
by the historical Buddha, the very circumstances of that teaching on Vulture Peak are rife with
mythological constructs and cosmic implications, such that the ordinary understanding of space
and time is subverted (see Morgan 1998, pp. 226–7; Wang 2005, p. 350). In short, while the
appeal to historical origins, in this case the Buddha’s vacana or “word of Buddha,” is still
employed, at the same time it is subtly undercut by Mahåyåna understandings of time, space
and the power of Buddhas to transcend these at will. As the Buddha himself (allegedly) put it,
“I am always here” (T. 9: 43b).
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ing. It is natural for scientific research to conclude that Íåkyamuni
Buddha was a historical figure. To regard him as a transcendent
being is pure foolishness.28
Almost hidden in this passage, couched within the more strident rejection of
the notion of Íåkyamuni as a supernatural being, one finds the significant
addendum: the Mahåyåna still carries on the “intention of the Buddha” (butsu-
i ), regardless of the fact that its teachings do not come directly from his
“golden mouth.”
Though some of Murakami’s remarks certainly indicate a DaijØ hibussetsu-
ron approach to denying the authenticity of the Mahåyåna, in general, BukkyØ
28 Need source citation
29 These figures are taken directly from Murakami 1997, pp. 392–99, with my translations.
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Diagram 1  The Circulation of Buddhism from Abhidharma to the Pure Land
Schools29
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tØitsuron employs a more nuanced approach, one that is at once surprising and
problematic, though not without a certain systematic elegance. Instead of see-
ing the belated Mahåyåna forms as more authentic elaborations of the original
thoughts of the Buddha (as per Inoue), or as examples of degeneration from an
original, pure set of teachings (as implied by Tominaga and, at times, by the
Critical Buddhists), Murakami proposes rather a dynamic “circulation” of
Buddhist doctrine. He represents this process schematically by way of a num-
ber of revolving circles, each of which is meant to indicate the flow between
the poles of the most important themes found in the Mahåyåna teachings (see
Diagram 1).
Examining these figures, it is hard to miss their decidedly Hegelian fla-
vor—thesis and antithesis working together to create a (higher?) synthesis or
sublation (Gr. aufgehoben) of differences. In this way, does Murakami sub-
sume the apparent contradictions and conflicts among sectarian visions of the
Buddhism, from Abhidharma (Jp. [A]bidon [ ] ) and Sattyasiddhi (Jp.
JØjitsu )30 through Yogåcåra (Jp. HossØ ), Mådhyamika (Jp. Sanron
), Tendai, Kegon , MikkyØ (i.e., Shingon), Nichiren and JØdo 
schools. Yet, for all the emphasis on sectarian harmony, it is important to
note that if these figures are taken in a temporal sense, which is a plausible
reading given the way that the various schools are located around the circle
in Fig. 19, they “culminate” in the JØdo or Pure Land schools to which
Murakami himself belonged. In other words, the various schools become lit-
tle more than preparatory experiments leading towards the ultimate end of
Pure Land Buddhism. Moreover, given the Hegelian flavor of Murakami’s
“circulation” figures, another question may be raised: Does Murakami’s
vision of Buddhist unification require Hegel’s commitment to Absolute
Reality “as the supersensible whole in which everything forms an integral and
organic part?”31
In a way that suggests, once more, the stricter Daijo hibussetsuron of
Tominaga, Murakami acknowledges that seminal Mahåyåna works such as
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30 An Indian school whose doctrines resemble in many ways those of the early Mahåyåna,
e.g, ß¨nya, established primarily on the teachings of the Satyasiddhi-ßåstra. See DDB.
31 Blocker and Starling 2001, p. 134. Blocker and Starling, along with Piovesana, cite Inoue
EnryØ as being the modern Japanese thinker most strongly influenced and committed to a
Hegelian vision of Buddhism, the author of BukkyØ katsuron going so far as to suggest that
“[t]he position of Buddhism, as manifested in Kegon-Tendai, does not differ in the slightest
from that of Hegel [because] matter and mind both become the one reason, the Tathagata”
(Piovesana 1963, p. 230).
14
Saddharmapuˆ∂ar¥kas¨tra and Hua-yen ching are, in fact, belated
developments rather than pure replications of the original teachings. How-
ever, he does not let this take away from their power or their ability to convey
key Buddhist truths—in particular, the truth of Suchness or Absolute Reality,
which Murakami refers to as the “Fourth Seal of the Dharma.” In fact, though
he does not take this nearly so far in the supercessionist32 direction as do his
peers Inoue and SØen, or K¨kai and the Saddharmapuˆ∂ar¥kas¨tra did long
before, Murakami does remark, almost in passing, that these belated works,
based as they are on the standpoint of the Absolute (hontai no chiritsu
), are able to convey their message on the problems of human life and the
cosmos more clearly, and without the “roughness” that one finds in the ear-
lier, “H¥nayåna” writings, which are based on the presumably inferior stand-
point of the phenomenal world (genshØkai no chiritsu ).33
Perhaps even more important is the shape that Murakami introduces in this
discussion—the large, all-encompassing sphere, around which the various
schools hover between two poles at opposite ends. Essentially, Murakami
wants to show that, while each school takes a distinct and sometimes unique
path, which is most evident in the external forms of its practice (including rit-
ual, but also variations in doctrine), they ultimately share a common source,
home and foundation in the core teachings of no-self and Nirvana (which, as
he argues elsewhere, themselves arise from the more basic teachings of the
Four Noble Truths, Eightfold Path, and the doctrine of equiprimordiality). It
is thus at the level of fundamental doctrine that the unity of Buddhism lies.
As with “developed” Mahåyåna teachings about Buddha-nature and original
enlightenment, the unity of Buddhism according to Murakami is in fact
already real, but only needs to be realized by Buddhists of his day—at the
“ideal” if not the “formal” level.
32 Perhaps a note is required on my use of this term, which in religious scholarship is gen-
erally used in the context of explaining the hermeneutical strategies of a fledging Christianity
as it emerged and sought to clarify its position vis-£-vis its parent religion, Judaism. The even-
tual consensus—(achieved after much debate and disputation, and in case of Marcion (c.
110–160), even schism—was that the Christian “New Covenant,” though clearly historically
belated with respect to the Jewish “Old Covenant,” effectively supersedes the latter, without
(the theory goes) erasing or denying its validity (in a sense similar to the term “sublation”).
Obviously, the subtleties in such an understanding were frequently lost on Christian leaders
and layfolk alike, thus providing a main source for centuries of Christian anti-semitism. Though
the parallel with the rise of the Mahåyåna is not perfect, I believe that there are enough simi-
larities to justify its application here.
33 Murakami 1997, p. 231.
T H E  E A S T E R N  B U D D H I S T  X X X V I I ,  1  &  2
15
Against this somewhat rosy scenario, Critical Buddhists, Matsumoto and
Hakamaya, see the same history as one that is rife with stasis, conflict, and
degeneration—the only bright spots being the rearguard efforts of heroes like
SØtØ school founder DØgen to stem the tide flowing away from True (i.e.,
“critical”) Buddhism. Critical Buddhism would point out that, while
Murakami may be right about the importance of strict adherence to the basic
doctrines underlying True Buddhism, he is far too tolerant in allowing for all
the “84,000” schools to have a home within the all-enveloping Buddhist
sphere, without discrimination on the basis of their specific teachings or prac-
tices. Yet, the issue is further complicated by the fact that, as we have seen
above, Murakami’s Hegelian spheres are not quite so all-encompassing as
they may at first appear, given the element of historical progression away from
the pure source and back to what appears to be the highest development in
the Pure Land teachings. Thus, from a Critical Buddhist perspective,
Murakami ends up with the worst of both worlds, combing an ideology of
harmony and non-discrimination with a covert supersessionism, based less
on solid rational argument or historical scholarship than on a combination of
sectarian affiliation and wishful thinking.34
Variations of Historicism
Perhaps one way to understand these important differences in the work of
Murakami and the Critical Buddhists is to see them as employing different
types of historicism. Above, I applied this term to the work of Tominaga, who
quite clearly pursued a path of scholarship based on the principle that the truth
of Buddhism can be found only through historical investigation. Thus
Tominaga (who, it should be recalled, wrote his works before Hegel) would
have had little problem accepting the Hegelian dictum that “Philosophy is the
history of philosophy.” Hegel also, however, argued that, as such, there can
be no objective way to determine which of the many competing historical the-
ories (or doctrines) are true—thus opening the door to what would eventually
be called “relativism.” This version of historicism, embraced by many so-
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34 Moreover, though this falls outside the scope of Critical Buddhism, we might also add
that Murakami is being paternalistic in effectively undercutting or stripping away the “exter-
nal forms” of the Buddhist rainbow in favor of a denuded, underlying essence. When he says,
of his own school, JØdo Shinsh¨ or True Pure Land Buddhism, that its beliefs in salvation via
Amida’s Western paradise are simply a cover for the ancient teachings about Nirvana, it is hard
not to feel that perhaps more is lost than gained in such a conclusion.
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called “postmodern” thinkers, is sometimes called today “New Historicism,”
since it actually goes further than the earlier version of Hegel, who combined
his historicist leanings with a conviction in the inexorable progressive work-
ings of History through the Absolute Spirit.35 Though the vocabulary is obvi-
ously quite different, Murakami’s dual commitment to historical research on
the one hand and his conviction of the underlying (and eventual?) unification
of Buddhist sects through a type of circulatory dialectic, on the other, belies
a commitment to a historicism remarkably akin to that of Hegel. In contrast,
Tominaga appears to embrace a version of historicism that flirts with origi-
nalism: the truths of Buddhism can be discovered not in the progressive
unfolding of Buddhist doctrines through dialectical interplay but rather
through the uncovering of the original teachings of the Buddha.
Along with the application of “discriminating wisdom” to all phenomena,
history also plays an important role in Critical Buddhism, since a clear knowl-
edge of the history of Buddhist doctrines in relation to Buddhist ethics and
politics helps us to understand and take measures to avoid repeating the mis-
takes of the past. Here, Critical Buddhism would laud Murakami’s own com-
mitment to history and historical research, but also his recognition, which one
can find in the early work of the journal BukkyØ shirin , that the
“facts” of history alone, shriven of doctrine or faith, cannot take us much fur-
ther along the path of reform and reconstruction. Moreover, despite superfi-
cial resemblances, both Murakami and the Critical Buddhists ultimately part
company with common modernist assumptions regarding the pure origins of
Buddhism before the Mahåyåna; even while retaining its strong criticism of
the Mahåyåna streams, Matsumoto and Hakamaya do not argue that the only
true Buddhism is original Buddhism, but rather that the only true Buddhism
is critical Buddhism, which means something entirely different. It must be
admitted, as Sueki Fumihiko has pointed out in his recent essay, that
Murakami was rather inconsistent in his attitudes to the relative importance
between history and doctrine, as well as the status of Mahåyåna within the
larger Buddhist tradition (Sueki 2004). However, although Murakami’s com-
mitment to history appears to have weakened over the decades, it never entire-
ly disappears, and serves to keep him apart from the growing trend towards
35 This more strictly Hegelian historicism—picked up and reworked on a materialist basis
by Marx—is roundly criticized in the works of Karl Popper, notably his Poverty of Historicism
(1944) and The Open Society and its Enemies (1945). In a fashion similar to Critical Buddhism,
Popper argued that this Hegelian view is the main theoretical presupposition underpinning
many forms of political authoritarianism and tyranny.
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the non-historical, existential brand of modernist Buddhism, developed in the
early and mid-twentieth century by the likes of D. T. Suzuki, the Kyoto
School, and sundry Western Buddhist popularizers.
“DaijØ bukkyØ”
Some of these same themes, as well as what might be seen as Murakami’s
growing ambivalence towards DaijØ hibussetsuron, emerge even more
strongly in a late article entitled “DaijØ bukkyØ” (Mahåyåna
Buddhism), where he says: “My contention is, the Buddha did not necessar-
ily teach the H¥nayåna or the Mahåyåna, as these are designations invented
later; what was really preached by the Buddha himself was primitive
Buddhism in which there was yet no differentiation.”36 Yet, Murakami fol-
lows this by allowing that some forms of early Buddhism do come close to
the original teachings—particularly those reliant on the Ógamas, as well as
the tradition known as Sarvåstivåda, an early Indian school well known for
its insistence on the reality of dharmas past, present, and future, and thus of
the phenomenal world—doctrines that would come to be heavily criticized
by Någårjuna, Asanga and the emerging Mahåyåna schools.37
However, as Murakami puts it, the Sarvåstivådins “were satisfied with a
logical, intellectual, and moral explanation of life, they took the world as it
appears to the senses, they neglected to pay attention to the deepest yearnings
of the soul, in fact they regarded these as not concerning our ethical and log-
ical life. It was these assumptions . . . that Någårjuna fiercely attacked. . . ”38
On the one hand, we might expect Murakami to praise the Sarvåstivådins, not
only for their adherence to the early Buddhist teachings, but also for their
attention to rational analysis and the ideal of “discriminating wisdom”—
which aligns well with Murakami’s early commitment to rationalism and
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36 Murakami 1921, p. 95.
37 Upon reflection, in many respects the Sarvåstivådins are the closest ancient sect or school
to modern Critical Buddhism. First, they are a scholarly movement, one committed to a form
of realism, but not to the extent of development what we might call a deep essentialism: the
non-reality of the forms we interact with are no less significant or useful for being “non-real,”
and even the fully-existent dharmas of which all things are composed do not appear to rest on
an overarching foundation or Reality (see Williams 2000, pp. 112–5). Given this, it is ironic,
from a CB perspective that it was the Mahåyåna tradition, with its development of tathågata-
garbha, Suchness, Buddha-nature, and original enlightenment, that seems to have relapsed into
the very ways of thinking that they originally fought so hard against.
38 Murakami 1921, pp. 97–98.
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critical, historical studies. Yet, on the other hand, it is impossible to read the
remark that the Sarvåstivådins dismissed the “deepest yearnings of the soul”
without hearing a strong note of approbation. In fact, Murakami goes on in
“DaijØ bukkyØ” to develop the thesis that Någårjuna helped establish a more
authentic expression of Buddhist teaching by adding a fourth “Seal” to the
H¥nayåna’s “Three Seals of the Dharma.” This “Fourth Seal” is Suchness or
Absolute Reality (Jp. shinnyo). As in BukkyØ tØitsuron, but in much more suc-
cinct and cursory fashion, Murakami outlines a genealogy of the development
of Mahåyåna after the rise of Sarvåstivåda: from Någårjuna, Asanga, and the
Ta-ch’eng chi’i-hsin lun, through Aßvago∑a, to the Chinese schools—divid-
ed, somewhat awkwardly, into four categories: “Perfect Doctrine” (i.e.,
T’ien-t’ai/Tendai, Kegon); “Extra-Scriptural” (i.e., Chan/Zen); “Esoteric”
(i.e., Shingon); and finally the Pure Land schools. Though the tone of this
short essay on “DaijØ bukkyØ” is largely descriptive (as, it might be argued,
are most of Murakami’s writings), the brief conclusion betrays the fact that
there is more at work here than a mere attempt to lay out the objective facts
of history. Here is how Murakami concludes the piece:
The Idea of Amitabha Buddha taught by the JØdo school seems at
first sight to contradict all the dogmas of Buddhism, but we know
that it is the moral and religious culmination of the Mahåyåna
Buddhology which unfolded itself after the passing of the Buddha
in conjunction with the development of Suchness (shinnyo) as the
ultimate reality of existence.39
We might spend many pages parsing these rather striking lines, but let us focus
on just two points. First, Murakami here openly plays the Mahåyåna super-
cessionist card—the theory or perhaps ideology by which each successive
school of Buddhist tradition replaces and in fact supersedes, in turn, each ear-
lier one. Not only is the Mahåyåna thus lauded as a gradual but persistent
“unfolding” of Buddhist truth (in contrast to DaijØ hibussetsuron, Critical
Buddhism, and even some of Murakami’s earlier statements), but now the
very school that, by the author’s own admission, seems to diverge most widely
from the early Buddhist path, is in fact the one that is lauded as the “culmi-
nation” of such a long and arduous development.
Second, and more pertinent to the concerns of Critical Buddhism,
Murakami here connects the “obvious” superiority of the Pure Land Way with
39 Ibid., p. 108. Emphasis added.
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the development of the so-called Fourth Seal of the Dharma—Absolute
Reality, Suchness or dharmadhåtu—which came to be considered in the
Mahåyåna as the essential ground or locus of equiprimordiality and thus of
all phenomena.40 Moreover, such a doctrine cannot, says Murakami, possi-
bly be explained or understood on a logical, rational basis—“it is beyond our
analytical understanding.”41 This line of thought, and the mode of express-
ing it, could hardly be more opposed to Critical Buddhism, which argues that
it is in fact the very development of essentialist doctrines like Suchness—
whether found in earlier Mahåyåna tathågatha-garbha and Buddha-nature or
the later and more specifically Japanese notion of “original enlightenment”—
that has most corrupted the true spirit of Buddhism, and that this has led to a
“mystical” and problematic notion that Buddhist truth is somehow beyond
language and reason. Furthermore, Murakami here makes the claim, though
without providing anything in the way of supporting evidence or argument,
that this gradual progress of the Mahåyåna, by way of the doctrine of Suchness
to the Pure Land schools, is one that is not only religious but also moral. Here
too, the contrast with Critical Buddhism could hardly be sharper, since both
Hakamaya and Matsumoto insist that it is precisely within the realm of ethics
(and politics) that Suchness wreaks havoc upon modern forms of Mahåyåna.
Below are two contrasting figures introduced by Matsumoto, showing the
structure of what he derisively calls either dhåtuvåda (a Sanskrit neologism
meaning something like “the way of essentialism”) or Topical Buddhism
(Diagram 2), and the reverse image of what Matsumoto takes to be “True”
Buddhism (Diagram 3):
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40 Cf. DDB entries on hokkai engi : “The dharmadhåtu as the environmental cause
of all phenomena, everything being dependent on everything else, therefore one is in all and
all in one;” nyoraizØ engi and shinyo engi : “Production from tathatå
(shinnyo) through the action of causation.” Such doctrines have their locus classicus in the Ta-
ch’eng chi’i-hsin lun, but find opposition in the writings of Faxiang and the ålayavijñåna doc-
trine of the HossØ school.
41 Murakami 1921, p. 99. Besides suggesting an even stronger move away from Kant to
Hegel, we might also suggest that in focusing here on the foundation of dharmadhåtu,
Murakami has moved away from the late nineteenth-century “science of religion” or Religions-
wissenschaft and closer to the so-called “phenomenology of religion” found in the early twen-
tieth-century works of Rudolf Otto and Mircea Eliade, a path that, in its insistence on a
common, non-rational “ground” to religion, corresponds in many ways with the work of D. T.
Suzuki, Hatano Seiichi, and the Kyoto School (see Tsuchiya 2000, p. 17). Yet, here again, in
the case of Otto, Eliade, Suzuki, et al., the non-verbal ground was located in a kind of imme-
diate experience—a line of argument suggested but not fully developed in Murakami.
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In Diagram 2, the components of phenomenal reality, or dharmas, arise from
a fundamental locus or ground, signified by terms such as dharmadhåtu and
ekayåna. This, says Matsumoto, though common, is a “non-Buddhist”
deviation from the proper understanding of Buddhism based on prat¥tya-
samutpåda, as portrayed in Diagram 3. Although the fit is not immediately
obvious, the so-called dhåtuvåda structure for the arisal of phenomenal real-
ity out of an underlying locus does in fact point to the heart of Murakami’s
own circulation thesis. In both cases, the individual elements—whether dhar-
mas or the variety of sectarian teachings—become epiphenomena whose
deeper reality must be sought in a singular, unified base. Though Murakami,
as we have seen, adds a Hegelian dynamism to the picture, which lessens the
sense of stasis, the framework remains, for all intents and purposes, a ‘topi-
cal’ one. As Matsumoto writes:
The structure of dhåtuvåda, whose affirmation of identity and non-
discrimination ironically ends up affirming and absolutizing actual
differences, can also be seen in the Japanese notion of “original
42 Adapted from Matsumoto 1989, p. 5, as well as a slightly revised version in Matsumoto
1997, p. 170.
43 Adapted from Matsumoto 1989, p. 67.
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Diagram 2  Matsumoto’s Map of the “Theory of Locus” or Dhåtuvåda Buddhism42
Diagram 3  Matsumoto’s Map of Prat¥tya-samutpåda Buddhism43
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enlightenment,” itself based on the tathågata-garbha tradition. . . .
The same phenomenon took place in India. The structure of dhåtu-
våda . . . had itself been the target of Shåkyamuni’s criticism—the
Brahman-åtman of the Upanishads . . . The important point is that
Shåkyamuni’s doctrine of causality, prat¥tya-samutpåda, can only
be understood when viewed as antithetical to the theory of a sin-
gular ground or cause of the manifold world—that is, to the idea of
dhåtuvåda . . . This is also the grounds for my thesis that tathågata-
garbha thought is not Buddhist.44
Now, it might be argued that neither side actually goes far towards proving
its case in this debate—one of the weakest links in Critical Buddhism is
precisely the assumption that quasi-essentialist doctrines have a direct and
deleterious effect on the ethical behavior of Buddhists. Yet, Matsumoto and
Hakamaya do have one thing on their side: the benefit of hindsight. Though
it may be impossible to prove their point, the suggestion that Buddhist doc-
trines may have played a shaping, if not a determinative role in the otherwise-
surprising complicity of virtually all mainstream Japanese Buddhist schools
in the development of imperial ideology of early ShØwa until the end of World
War II cannot be so easily dismissed. It remains a compelling hypothesis, one
that I believe is bolstered by the recent work of scholars like Brian Victoria,
Bernard Faure, Christopher Ives and Robert Sharf.45 This is not to suggest
that Murakami, or his peers, should be held culpable for the emergence of
what would later be called by the seemingly paradoxical term, Imperial Way
Buddhism (KØdØzen ).46 Yet, the case can and perhaps needs to be made
that some of Murakami’s ideas, especially in his later writings, such as those
proposing the development of “Suchness” as the basis for the “obvious” supe-
riority of Mahåyåna or more specifically Pure Land buddhology and moral-
ity, and the criticism—if such it be—of Abhidharma and the Sarvåstivådins
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44 Matsumoto 1997, p. 172.
45 See, e.g., Victoria 1997, Victoria 2003, Faure 1991, Faure 2002, Ives 1999, Ives 2001,
Ives 2005, Sharf 1993, Heisig and Maraldo 1994. A Japanese precedent can be found in the
postwar writings of Ichikawa Hakugen, particularly Ichikawa 1970.
46 There are certainly conservative and even nationalist currents in Murakami’s thought and
writings ( just as there are, more obviously, in the work of Inoue EnryØ)—the best example
being his 1912 essay entitled “Loyalty [to the Emperor] and Filial Piety in Buddhism,” pub-
lished, along with pieces by both Inoues (EnryØ and TetsujirØ) in a work entitled SonnØ aikoku
ron (Essays on Reverence for the Emperor and Patriotism).
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in particular for sacrificing “the soul’s deepest yearnings” on the altar of logic
and intellection, appear to coalesce in a number of respects with the highly
destructive Buddhist ideologies of the 1920s, ’30s and ’40s.
Moving straight to the heart of the matter, from a Critical Buddhist per-
spective the biggest stumbling-block to retrieving Murakami’s work today is
the very thing that may at first seem to be its greatest appeal—the notion of
Buddhist unification. This is a matter that goes beyond the simple accusation
that Murakami or his writings—like those of most of his peers—supported or
endorsed in some way the emerging nationalist ideology and loyalty of
religious institutions to the imperial household. While the desire to bring
together a fractured tradition seems laudable in its aspirations to “tolerance,”
particularly within religious traditions that have fought sectarian battles (i.e.,
all of them), a strong counter-argument suggests that, in our present, “post-
modern” age, such unification can only be built upon a shared appreciation
for diversity, not upon the imposition of some deeper, underlying similarity.
Of course, there are similarities and shared doctrinal grounds among the var-
ious streams of Buddhism, but to suggest that only what is shared is relevant
or truly Buddhist seems to be drifting into dangerous ideological waters, not
to mention the supersessionist tendencies in the specific version of histori-
cism employed by Murakami. After all, the rhetoric of harmony—based on
a romanticist organic model in which, despite “superficial” distinctions, a
people or Volk share a deep, fundamental common accord—has been used in
modern times as one of the foundations of modern fascism, in Japan as in
Germany and Italy.47
Consider the following provisional chart, presented here as a possible
Critical Buddhist approach to the problems of unification and non-sectarian
Buddhist scholarship.
Here, Buddhism remains “founded” on a core set of doctrines such as
47 Besides the obvious example of the kokutai or “one body of the nation” led by the
divine emperor, one might include the almost risibly euphemistic “Greater East Asia Co-
Prosperity Sphere” (Dai tØa kyØei ken )—based on the notion that, in creating
their empire, the Japanese armies were simply “reminding” other Asian nations of their unity
vis-£-vis the encroaching Western nations. Here, real, important differences—including resis-
tance to brutal Japanese occupation—disappear from view in favor of an (imposed) ideology
of peace and brotherhood. The Buddhist element here can be found in the fact that some
Japanese Buddhist leaders were in fact supporting imperial expansion in the name of “remind-
ing” Asian Buddhists of their true, common heritage (which, alas, they had lost); see Victoria
1997, passim.
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prat¥tya-samutpåda and anåtman. Yet, these are not taken to be part of a
larger, deeper or more fundamental ground in “Suchness” or “Absolute
Reality.” Rather, the basic doctrines give rise to new doctrines, through the
principle of causality: like all dharmas, doctrines arise historically in an inter-
dependent fashion. This chart recognises that the principle of equiprimor-
diality is more than just a doctrine or point of faith, but a method that must
be applied wholesale to reflection on Buddhist tradition and study of the emer-
gence and development of sectarian differences. Here is a point which
Murakami may have something to add to Critical Buddhism, since, for all his
attempts at unification, he is clearly more willing to appreciate the contin-
gency of sectarian teachings, without dismissing them out of hand if they fail
to conform to certain standards of rationality. The movement of the various
parts here indicates that the model for discussion and debate is more akin to
Socratic than Hegelian dialectics. Yet, what Murakami’s vision lacks, due
partly to his historical circumstances but also to his emphasis on unification,
is a deep recognition of the political and ideological elements involved in the
development of Buddhist doctrine. A truly critical, non-sectarian scholarship
must come to terms with the complications introduced by ideology in doctri-
nal history.
Murakami’s Legacy: (Critical) Buddhist Theology?
After the above cautionary remarks regarding the pitfalls of placing too much
value on unification, I would like to conclude with a more positive evaluation
of Murakami’s work, framed by the question of whether Murakami—this
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early if inconsistent champion of historical scholarship and non-sectarian-
ism—might be considered a practitioner of something that has of late come
to be known as “Buddhist theology.” According to Roger Jackson and John
Makransky, whereas, by and large:
scholars trained in Religious Studies (including Buddhist Studies)
critically analyze the data of a religion at a distance from tradition,
to develop theories of interest to the Western academy [, b]y con-
trast, contemporary theologians who have been trained by and stand
within a religious tradition use the same tools for a different purpose:
to draw critically upon the resources of tradition to help it commu-
nicate in a new and authentic voice to the contemporary world.48
As I have argued elsewhere,49 both Matsumoto and Hakamaya can fall
within this category, based on the fact that, despite their affection for Des-
cartes and sometimes positivist rhetoric, they make no secret of the fact that
the aim of their work is less to discover the objective Truth of Buddhism (they
deride the particularly Weberian method of objectivity that undergirds much
modern scholarship),50 than to promote a particular “Buddhistic” agenda,
although one that, in their view, aligns very well with the values and aims of
the European Enlightenment. In other words, Critical Buddhism has the
explicit purpose of criticizing, reinterpreting, developing, and ultimately
advocating a “superior” form of the Buddhist religion. The goal is not the
uncovering of truth or to make a “contribution to knowledge” or to “the acad-
emy,” but to get Japanese Buddhists to realize the errors of their ways. Indeed,
of late, Matsumoto has moved away from the term Critical Buddhism and
begun to proclaim his recent work an exercise in “Critical Theology.”51
How does Murakami’s work relate to this emerging area of Buddhist the-
ology? First, it should be recalled that the term sh¨kyØ , usually translated
48 Makransky 2000, p. ix; see also Makransky 2000, p. 19 for a similar but more extended
explanation of “Buddhist theology.”
49 See XXX of this issue.
50 See Hakamaya 1997.
51 Matsumoto 2000, pp. 1–12. Steven Heine (2001) discusses the “transition” in a more
recent work of Matsumoto, away from Critical Buddhism towards what Matsumoto himself
refers to as “Critical Theology” (hihan sh¨gaku ), but I am more inclined to see a
development in a more specific “theological” direction, rather than a turn away from “criti-
cism” towards “theology”—since I would lump Critical Buddhism itself within a broad the-
ological framework.
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today as “religion,” actually means something more like “sectarian teach-
ings.” Until the Meiji period and the influx of Western scholarly methods,
Buddhist “scholarship” in Japan (with the exception of rare thinkers like
Tominaga) was largely sectarian studies. Murakami, along with others in-
volved in the development of “academic Buddhism” (kØdan bukkyØgaku
), introduced a scholarly approach quite distinct from the work of
more traditional Buddhist sectarian writers. Yet Murakami does not follow
the path towards a pure “religious studies” or Religionswissenschaft ap-
proach. Like the Critical Buddhists, he is clearly interested in promoting a
“Buddhistic” agenda.52 BukkyØ tØitsuron is not meant to be simply a com-
prehensive genealogy of the Mahåyåna, but, more importantly, a call to action
in the name of greater Buddhist harmony. Though ponderous in style, it is a
work that remains every bit as much a manifesto as Hakamaya’s Hihan bukkyØ
or Matsumoto’s Engi to k¨. Moreover, for all its weakness when judged by
contemporary standards of historical scholarship, it remains of interest as a
work that strives to forge a difficult balance between objectivity and polemic,
at a time when most Buddhist scholars were lining up firmly on either side of
the divide.
The benefits of “Buddhist theology” are many, but in particular the frank
admission of Buddhist affiliation, and the corollary belief that scholarly work
may have a goal that goes beyond the search for empirical facts or some
“objective” truth, combined with a commitment to intellectual honesty and a
desire to test whatever is testable (without dismissing as unimportant that
which is not), provides a potentially fertile “middle way” between the more
strict terms of so-called “objective” scholarship (whose methodology has
recently taken a number of hits from feminist, “postmodern” and “postcolo-
nial” scholars) and simple sectarian apologetics.53 A final problem that besets
much modern Japanese Buddhist scholarship is the tendency to focus on ideas
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52 As early as the foundation of BukkyØ shirin, his journal dedicated to historical Buddhist
research, Murakami was attempting to trace a “middle path” between the so-called “scien-
tific” historians on the one hand, and the “moralists” on the other, by following a Buddhistic
(bukkyØ shugi) perspective (BukkyØ shirin 1, no. 2, p. 1). Sueki calls this “a particular charac-
teristic of . . . Murakami’s historical perspective on Buddhism” (Sueki 2004, p. 94).
53 David Tracy has defined theology in this sense as “intellectual reflection within a reli-
gious tradition”—but reflection that falls somewhere between the lines of apologetics and his-
torical studies (Jackson and Makransky 2000, p. 2). Heine (2000, p. 133) notes that the Japanese
term sh¨gaku —though literally translated as “sectarian studies”—actually contains
Tracy’s sense.
26
over practice—a trend that, according to Nishijima GudØ, was actually rein-
forced by Western influence during the period of shin bukkyØ.54 This is a prob-
lem that should draw our attention away from Buddhist theology and towards
Engaged Buddhism, an applied form of Buddhist studies now flourishing in
the West and in various, mostly Theravåda, Buddhist countries. Though Cri-
tical Buddhism also outlined a vision of Buddhism that is at once ethically
and politically engaged, with perhaps one exception,55 neither Hakamaya nor
Matsumoto went very far towards introducing or implementing practical
reforms themselves—their work remained largely enclosed within the ivory
tower of ideas.56 Yet, it is precisely the emphasis on the relevance of doctrine
and fundamental beliefs to Buddhist ethics and socio-political engagement
that remains the most important legacy of Critical Buddhism, and one that
must be retained in any contemporary movement towards Buddhist reform,
let alone Buddhist unification.
Conclusion
In his magnum opus, BukkyØ tØitsuron, Murakami attempts to employ the
tools of modern scholarship to discern a clear historical and doctrinal foun-
dation for Buddhism. In discussing more specifically these foundations of
Buddhism, Murakami comes up with three general principles, all of which
seem to coalesce well with the Critical Buddhism of Matsumoto ShirØ and
Hakamaya Noriaki: (1) the priority of reason over revelation; (2) the priority
of subjectivity over objectivity; and (3) the ultimate goal of liberation from
ignorance.57 Yet, unlike the Critical Buddhists, Murakami also called for the
emergence of a universal, non-sectarian Buddhism based on a set of unified
and undisputed doctrines. In other words, Murakami’s vision was more con-
structive than critical—or, at least, was intended to be both. As a result, he
was not completely dismissive of the Mahåyåna teachings, coming to see
54 Nishijima 1997, pp. 19–20.
55 The one exception being their work towards ending social discrimination towards the
burakumin or “outcastes” of Japan (see Bodiford 1996).
56 Stone (1999, p. 183) provides the most concise argument against this weakness of Critical
Buddhism, though she is not alone in making note of it. One may even get a sense of this in
the fact of the “idealization” of the aristocratic philosopher DØgen, whose ideas and life, as
Heine (2001, p. 136) notes, appear to be much less “conducive to social reforms” than any of
the other Kamakura Buddhist reformers, who tend to be ignored by Critical Buddhism. This
also, of course, raises the question of their own sectarian biases.
57 Murakami 1997, p. 53.
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these as belated but nonetheless significant adaptations and permutations of
the core Buddhist truths taught by Íåkyamuni. A tension thus arises in his
work between the call for a historical approach and the desire to bring about
or “realize” an already existing doctrinal unity among Buddhist schools.
While Murakami’s usage of what amounts to a Hegelian version of histori-
cism can be criticized on a number of levels, his commitment to critical schol-
arship, engaged in a constructive “Buddhist theology,” makes his work, for
all its flaws, worthy of reconsideration.
ABBREVIATION
DDB Digital Dictionary of Buddhism, edited by Charles Muller, 
<http://www.buddhism-dict.net/ddb/index.html> (12 June, 2006).
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